--- title: "U.S. Cyberspace Policy, AI & Web 3.0 — Study Presentation — SIR" canonical_url: "https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/" date_modified: "2026-09-16" language: "en" source_sha256: "7131f0c82112d670bedfcb89a09400395a2cfe849b10d3c5bae214f88310c652" --- Canonical page: https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/ ## Section links - [The Battleground You Live In](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/#1) - [Start with the water.](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/#2) - [The network has a digital layer.](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/#3) - [Everything is plugged into everything.](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/#4) - [Five domains, one battleground.](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/#5) - [Estonia, 2007.](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/#6) - [What Estonia built.](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/#7) - [Sweden: the whole society.](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/#8) - [Artificial intelligence.](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/#9) - [Web 3.0, and how thin the evidence is.](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/#10) - [A front made of words.](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/#11) - [One question, four countries, eighteen questions each.](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/#12) - [The numbers, honestly.](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/#13) - [The United Kingdom: the long game.](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/#14) - [The United States: everything, and no centre.](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/#15) - [No country is an island.](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/#16) - [Slide 17](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/#17) - [The catch.](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/#18) - [Rules do nothing on their own.](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/#19) - [Three things the study asks of the United States.](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/#20) - [The state can name the domain. It cannot own it.](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/#21) - [Read it. Hear it. Check it.](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/#22) - [The record.](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/#23) - [Compare consistently. Understand in context.](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/#24) [Cite research](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/references/waddell-2025-cyberspace-policies/) [← Archive](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/) [Read explainer](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/explainers/the-battleground-you-live-in/) Explainer [Method](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/method/) ‹ › Read Listen Plainly A story from a 2025 doctoral study # The Battleground You Live In How cyberspace became critical infrastructure, then a domain of power, and what four countries do about it. Adapted from the dissertation of **Scott W. Waddell, D.S.I.**, American Public University System, 2025. Findings are as of the study's completion in early 2025. The podcast linked from this site uses a synthetic voice. The presentation is grounded in the study; added sector details cite CISA and other official sources, and the methods page identifies the author's account of AI assistance. Use the arrow keys to move; press P for a plain-English line on any slide. This is the story of the network your daily life runs on, and why four countries guard it in different ways. Act 1 · The network you live in ## Start with the water. 16 sectors. Shared dependencies. Select any sector to follow its dependencies. 1. 01 Chemical 2. 02 Commercial Facilities 3. 03 Communications 4. 04 Critical Manufacturing 5. 05 Dams 6. 06 Defense Industrial Base 7. 07 Emergency Services 8. 08 Energy 9. 09 Financial Services 10. 10 Food and Agriculture 11. 11 Government Services and Facilities 12. 12 Healthcare and Public Health 13. 13 Information Technology 14. 14 Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste 15. 15 Transportation Systems 16. 16 Water and Wastewater Systems Follow a dependency ### Clean water supports patient care Chemical Treatment chemicals Water + wastewater Water for care Healthcare + public health Water plants use treatment chemicals from outside suppliers. Health providers need water to clean, sterilize tools, and give care such as dialysis. Treatment supplies can matter far beyond the water plant. Arrows follow a service from its provider to its user. Sources for this example - [CISA: Infrastructure Dependency Primer — Learn](https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/resilience-services/infrastructure-dependency-primer/learn) Types of Dependencies, Physical example, identifies chemicals and electricity as water-facility inputs; the preceding supply-chain paragraph names chlorine for treatment. - [Healthcare and Public Health Sector-Specific Plan (May 2016), p. 12](https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-healthcare-public-health-2015-508.pdf#page=19) Figure 8 Water and Wastewater Systems entry identifies sanitation, renal dialysis, sterilization, and other healthcare water uses. The final sentence is an illustrative inference from the two dependencies. [Read all 16 examples ↗](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/dependencies/) A disruption in one sector **can affect others.** About the examples and sector names These are selected service dependencies from official sources, not a complete network or new findings from the study. The dissertation explains interconnection on pp. 10–11 and names the sector count on p. 19. Sector labels follow [CISA’s list](https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors); older documents use “Government Facilities” for Government Services and Facilities. The United States identifies sixteen critical infrastructure sectors. Select a sector to see a service it uses and a service it provides. Trouble can spread through these connections, but a disruption does not always cause a wider failure. Act 1 · The network you live in ## The network has a digital layer. Information technology supports operations across the other 15 sectors. **Information\ Technology** Software · Computing\ Data services A shared digital layer - Chemical - Commercial Facilities - Communications - Critical Manufacturing - Dams - Defense Industrial Base - Emergency Services - Energy - Financial Services - Food and Agriculture - Government Services and Facilities - Healthcare and Public Health - Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste - Transportation Systems - Water and Wastewater Systems Explore the connections ### What does IT make possible? Select a sector to see an example of the software, computing, or data services it uses. Source for this example \ These links show reliance on IT services. Sectors also connect directly and through communications, energy, water, and transportation. Sources and what this diagram shows [CISA: Information Technology Sector](https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors/information-technology-sector) and the [2016 IT Sector-Specific Plan, pp. 2, 4](https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-01/nipp-ssp-information-technology-2016-508%20%281%29.pdf). This is a schematic of shared reliance, not a map of traffic routes. IT and Communications are distinct sectors that work together to provide Internet services. Other dependencies exist alongside this digital layer. Information technology supplies software, computing, and data services across the other fifteen sectors. This picture shows one layer of their connections. Sectors also rely on each other in many other ways, including communications, energy, water, and transportation. Act 1 · The network you live in ## Everything is plugged into everything. The study leans on an idea called **Systems Theory**: a country's infrastructure is one interlocking system, and its security has to be judged as a whole, not piece by piece. ### A breach in financial networks can disrupt global supply chains. ### An attack on the energy sector has the potential to cripple communication systems. Wiring critical infrastructure into one network changed the nature of the risk: from *isolated incidents* to *systemic risks* that cross sectors. You cannot judge the safety of one piece on its own, because trouble travels along the connections. Act 1 · The network you live in ## Five domains, one battleground. The United States Department of Defense counts cyberspace as an operational domain alongside air, land, maritime, and space. Four familiar domains, plus one. That makes five. Cyberspace “serves both as a battleground and as a vital enabler of economic and societal functions.”the study, p. 18 ### Three pillars U.S. policy rests on deterrence, defense, and resilience. ### Offense and defense The country has built offensive capabilities alongside defensive ones. ### No borders Cyberspace lacks clear territorial boundaries, and states compete to shape its rules. The study's own phrase: cyberspace evolves “as both a *domain of power* and a critical infrastructure layer.” Not the power at the wall. The kind states hold. Armies have always had land, sea, air, and space. Now they also have the place where you check your bank balance. Act 2 · The day it stopped being theory ## Estonia, 2007. Not with tanks. With traffic. Estonia's banks and government institutions came under attack: **distributed denial-of-service** attacks, which flood a site with so many fake requests that real people cannot get through. Estonians dealt with the state online, through a national digital identity system. That made the country modern. It also made it exposed. The response was government and business side by side, including the bank **Swedbank**, pooling what they had. The study calls 2007 the moment Estonia stopped treating cybersecurity as a technical issue and started treating it as a *core national defense priority*. The study gives no date within the year, no named attacker, and no scene. Neither does this slide. In 2007 a small country's banks and government sites were flooded offline. Government and companies had to fix it together. Act 2 · The day it stopped being theory ## What Estonia built. ### A data embassy A backup of critical state data kept beyond its borders, so that data stays secure and reachable during an attack. ### NATO's cyber defence centre Based in Tallinn and established in response to the 2007 attacks. Its annual exercise simulates a large-scale cyberattack with private technology companies and national security forces. ### A Cyber Defence League Volunteer private-sector specialists who provide support during cyber incidents, under a unified military command. ### A “no-legacy principle” Replace outdated systems quickly, so new technologies can be integrated without the drag of old ones. Its limits are just as concrete: budget constraints, a shortage of skilled people, and proximity to Russia with the persistent threat of state-sponsored attacks. Estonia keeps a spare copy of its most important data abroad, hosts NATO's cyber training, and replaces outdated systems quickly. Act 2 · The day it stopped being theory ## Sweden: the whole society. The 2007 attacks next door were a wake-up call for Sweden, which strengthened its energy, finance, and telecommunications sectors as critical national infrastructure. ### One coordinator The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, MSB, coordinates what Sweden calls a whole-of-society approach: government, civil society, and business together. ### A Cyber Defense Act Sets standards in sectors like finance and healthcare and requires public and private players to cooperate. ### Telia and Ericsson Partnerships with its telecom companies secure the country's communications. “The challenge is not the technology itself, but how rapidly it changes, making it difficult for regulations to keep up.”a Swedish stakeholder, as quoted in the study, p. 61 Sweden's answer: task forces that put regulators and industry leaders in the same room, so that policy stays agile. Sweden's answer is to put government, companies, and citizens in the same room and keep them there. Act 3 · The next expansion ## Artificial intelligence. AI can watch a network and react to an attack in real time. The study calls it “no longer a discrete technological consideration but a foundational element of national security policy.” ### It can be fooled AI systems are vulnerable to adversarial attacks and to manipulated data. ### Its failures spread A failure in AI-driven security can cascade across energy, telecommunications, and finance. ### It needs people and rules Institutions, standards, and a skilled workforce able to manage and regulate AI-enhanced systems. AI can spot an attack faster than people can. It can also be tricked, and when it fails, the failure spreads. Act 3 · The next expansion ## Web 3.0, and how thin the evidence is. Web 3.0 is a loose name for systems built on blockchains and other decentralized tools, where no single company or agency holds the keys. Digital identities, smart contracts, and tokenized financial systems are being wired into economies. ### No single point of failure Decentralization makes it harder for attackers to target one point of failure. ### No single point of control It also brings substantial regulatory challenges, because traditional frameworks struggle with decentralized systems. 5 of 184 coded references in the policy-adaptation theme concern the impact of Web 3.0 A count of what the documents talked about, not a score. Even Estonia, the study's digital leader, has yet to fully integrate Web 3.0 into its cybersecurity strategy. Web 3.0 spreads control out so no one can knock out the centre. That also means no one is clearly in charge, and the study found little evidence about it yet. Act 3 · The next expansion ## A front made of words. The study notes that cyber-enabled disinformation can destabilize democratic institutions and influence public discourse. The domain where you pay your bills is also the domain where you form your opinions. Both are now contested. The same network that carries your bills also carries the arguments that shape what people believe. Act 4 · Four countries, one lens ## One question, four countries, eighteen questions each. “How can the United States develop and adapt its cyberspace policies to effectively safeguard national security interests amidst the emergence of Web 3.0 and AI technologies?”the main research question, p. 5 ### Four cases Estonia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States, each asked the same standardized questions. ### Six themes Policy adaptation; compliance and regulation; public-private collaboration; education and workforce; national security and resilience; international cooperation. Three questions each. ### Documents, not interviews National strategies, laws, government reports, academic papers, and industry white papers, read and coded passage by passage with NVivo. No one was interviewed. ### Two lenses Systems Theory: everything is connected. Capacity Building Theory: rules need institutions, people, and partners. One researcher asked four countries the same eighteen questions and read their documents to find the answers. Act 4 · Four countries, one lens ## The numbers, honestly. Passages from the four countries' documents were tagged into six themes. Across the six theme tables, that comes to **989** tagged references. National security and resilience 254 Public-private collaboration 216 Policy adaptation and technology 184 Compliance and regulation 167 Education and workforce 89 International cooperation 79 These counts tell you how often a country's documents talked about something, **not how well the country did it**. The study itself avoids judging any country's effectiveness or global standing. The United States had the most references in most tables. One plain reason could be that it produces a great many documents; that is this deck's reading, not the study's claim. In the national-security theme, the most-tagged idea across all four countries was protecting critical infrastructure; the second was cyber warfare and defense. The study counted how often each country's documents mentioned each idea. A high count means a lot of talk, not a good grade. Act 4 · Four countries, one lens ## The United Kingdom: the long game. ### One centre Britain runs its cyber policy through the National Cyber Security Centre, and plays for the long term. ### Cyber Essentials An affordable baseline of security for small and medium-sized businesses. ### Sharing since 2013 A partnership called CiSP lets government and companies trade threat information in real time. Active Cyber Defence hands organizations tools that take down phishing sites. ### CyberFirst Reaches students from secondary school through professional training, with scholarships and internships. Apprenticeships run alongside it. Its worries mirror its strengths: some regions have better access to cyber education than others; its own cyber agency says AI is advancing faster than the ability to regulate it; and leaving the European Union meant negotiating new agreements to keep sharing threat data. Britain runs cyber policy through one centre and plans years ahead, and still cannot train people fast enough everywhere. Act 4 · Four countries, one lens ## The United States: everything, and no centre. **It has more of everything.** It leads the world in AI innovation. Its NIST cybersecurity framework, built with industry and academia, has been adopted and translated by countries around the world, and NIST followed it with a framework for AI risk. Information Sharing and Analysis Centers link critical industries. CyberCorps pays for students' cybersecurity education in exchange for government service. “Hunt forward” operations find threats with allies before they arrive. ### So what is the problem? The United States is not one system. Federal rules, state rules, and private-sector rules frequently diverge. - **Healthcare.** Federal privacy law, HIPAA, sits on top of state rules that vary, and the mismatch delayed comprehensive security protocols and left critical areas exposed. - **States.** Federal initiatives are frequently met with resistance from states that prefer local control. A company in several states faces several rulebooks. - **Trust.** Companies worry about privacy, liability, and competitors. Even after a 2015 law to encourage sharing, many still hold back. - **Timing.** The study finds the United States tends to address threats as they arise, where Britain plans ahead. America has the most technology and the most rules, and the rules do not agree with each other. Act 5 · No country is an island ## No country is an island. Cyberattacks cross borders. All four countries belong to alliances that try to share the load, and the study says no single country can address these threats alone. ### Estonia Helps run research and training at NATO's cyber centre, and takes part in the EU's cyber rapid response teams. ### Sweden Works through the European Union and its Nordic neighbours, and aligns with the EU's data protection law, GDPR. ### Britain Belongs to Five Eyes, the intelligence-sharing alliance with the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. ### United States Takes part in the United Nations group that writes the norms for how states should behave in cyberspace. Europe has one data protection law. The United States has sector-by-sector rules and voluntary sharing, and the study finds the mismatch complicates data sharing with allies. An executive order that limits foreign access to sensitive American data protects the country and, at the same time, makes cooperation harder. Attacks cross borders, so defence has to as well. Sharing with allies is harder when your privacy rules do not match theirs. Act 6 · The twist and the limits Size is not what decides it. The assumption has always been that the biggest economy, with the most technology and the deepest pockets, leads in cybersecurity. The study says its analysis challenges assumptions that larger economies inherently lead in cybersecurity innovation. Estonia's ability to innovate despite limited resources “suggests that governance agility and focused resource allocation are equally critical.”the study, p. 322 The study calls this its most significant theoretical contribution. The country with the most money is not the one the others are told to learn from. The small one that got hit first is. Act 6 · The twist and the limits ## The catch. - **No universal blueprint.** The study says outright that there is none, only practices that can be adapted with care, and it declines to position any one country as a universal model. - **A snapshot.** Findings reflect each country at the time the documents were collected, and the study warns some may already be out of date. - **Translation needed.** A lesson from a small, centralized state may not transfer to a large, decentralized one without its context. - **Documents, not interviews.** The study saw what governments said, not always what they did. - **The author's own lens.** The researcher's preconceptions could have influenced the reading, a risk careful method reduces but, in the study's words, cannot be entirely eliminated. - **Web 3.0 is thin.** It is in the title, but there is little of it in the data. The study does not hand anyone a recipe. It shows what worked somewhere, when, and warns you about copying it. Act 6 · The twist and the limits ## Rules do nothing on their own. If a country has good cybersecurity rules, why would it still get hacked? Because rules do nothing on their own. The study's second lens, **Capacity Building Theory**, says they need institutions to apply them, trained people to run them, and partners in business who actually cooperate. “Without sustained investment in workforce development, even the most well-designed cybersecurity policies and regulatory frameworks risk becoming ineffective.”the study, p. 13 Human error, the study notes, remains one of the most common causes of security breaches. A great fire plan is worthless if nobody in the building knows where the extinguishers are. A good rulebook is worthless if nobody is trained to use it. Act 7 · Who holds the domain ## Three things the study asks of the United States. 1 · Decide who is in charge A unified national cybersecurity framework; a federal task force working with CISA and NIST to bring federal and state rules into line; a central coordinating body modelled on Britain's. 2 · Make partnership formal, and worth it Standing platforms where government and industry talk; real-time sharing; tax credits, grants, and liability protection for companies that take part. 3 · Build the people Cybersecurity in schools from the early grades, expanded vocational training, and scholarships that create a pipeline. These are proposals informed by the comparison, with no promise that one package works everywhere. “The time to act is now.”the author's closing words, p. 349 The study's advice comes down to three things: agree on who decides, make working together worth it, and train the people. Act 7 · Who holds the domain ## The state can name the domain. It cannot own it. In the air, at sea, on land, and in space, the military is the one that shows up. In cyberspace, the front line is a water plant owned by a utility, a hospital, a bank, and the phone in your pocket. ### Estonia put the state itself at the centre and rebuilt around it. ### Sweden put one agency at the centre and made partnership the law. ### Britain put one centre at the centre and played the long game. ### The United States by design, has no centre. That is the gap the study's recommendations try to close. A country's cybersecurity is not a product it buys. It is a shape it agrees to take. The military can call cyberspace a domain, but it cannot own it. That is why deciding who is in charge matters so much. Resources · Read it, hear it, check it ## Read it. Hear it. Check it. The explainer article ### The Battleground You Live In About 4,000 words, written for a general reader. ▤ Read here [↓ Download PDF](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/explainers/the-battleground-you-live-in/The-Battleground-You-Live-In.pdf) The podcast ### A single-host episode, 14 minutes 40 seconds Narrated by a synthetic voice, and it says so. ▶ Listen ▤ Transcript [↓ Download MP3](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/podcasts/O2-Single_Host-Jordan-claude-fable-5-1-CORRECTED-20260912.mp3) The study Waddell, Scott Wayne. 2025. *Advancing U.S. Cyberspace Policies in the Age of AI and Web 3.0: A Comparative Case Study on Securing United States National Security Interests.* Doctor of Strategic Intelligence dissertation, American Public University System. ProQuest Dissertations & Theses. ISBN 979-8-3101-4740-9. Read the open-access dissertation at its official ProQuest record. [↗ Read the study on ProQuest](https://www.proquest.com/docview/3180520287) Read the open-access study on ProQuest. The article and podcast explain its findings. Added sector details cite CISA and other official sources. The record · How this was made ## The record. - **One finished, published study.** It was never edited. Everything here, the article, the podcast, and these slides, is a derivative of it. - **Claims tied to their sources.** The main account points to the dissertation. Added sector details cite CISA and other official sources; the research AI-use disclosure is attributed to the author. - **Checked across vendors.** Each derivative is reviewed by an AI model from a different vendor family than the one that produced it, against frozen file hashes. The podcast review is complete. The article has been reviewed and revised; its final acceptance record remains open. DeepSeek completed this presentation’s independent source-fidelity and browser review on September 17, 2026. See the review note for scope and limitations. - **Synthetic voice, disclosed.** The podcast narrator is a synthetic voice, and the episode says so. - **Hashes on record.** The published bundle and frozen source bundle have separate file manifests. The review note below explains the review scope, file identities, and remaining qualifications. - **No new research.** Nothing here extends, replicates, or updates the study. [▤ Revision review note](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/REVIEW.md) AI models helped make these materials from the study. The podcast and article have been reviewed; this revised study presentation has its own separate validation status. Explore the research · The method behind the findings ## Compare consistently. Understand in context. Structured-focused comparative case study analysis. 01 ### A common basis. The same 18 questions organize the evidence for all four countries. 02 ### A clear focus. Each comparison addresses the policy issues at the heart of the research question. 03 ### Context stays visible. Patterns emerge without treating countries with different institutions and resources as interchangeable. 04 ### A traceable interpretation. Coded passages, comparisons across sources, and research notes support the path to policy lessons. How this study used it ### Follow the evidence from question to policy lesson. Explore why these countries were chosen, how the documents were analyzed, and how the researcher and tools contributed. Question **↓** Four cases · same questions **↓** Documents · codes · themes **↓** Comparison · policy lessons [Explore how the study was done ↗](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/method/) A consistent comparison preserves the detail needed to judge which policy lessons might transfer. Source: dissertation, Chapter 3, pp. 32–49. ## Original research Waddell, S. W. (2025). *Advancing U.S. cyberspace policies in the age of AI and Web 3.0: A comparative case study on securing United States national security interests* \[Doctoral dissertation (Doctor of Strategic Intelligence), American Public University System\]. ProQuest Dissertations & Theses. [APA, MLA, Chicago & reference downloads](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/references/waddell-2025-cyberspace-policies/) · [Original scholarly record ↗](https://www.proquest.com/docview/3180520287) Cite the dissertation for its findings. Retain the page, table or section reference shown with the content. Sources credited separately on a slide support that material. The study asked the same questions about four countries, kept each country's circumstances in view, and compared the evidence to develop lessons for the United States. ## Cite the original research Close These formats cite the original dissertation. The SIR presentation is a separate adaptation. Choose a bibliography format. Chicago notes and bibliography is shown as a bibliography entry; add the relevant page number when citing a specific passage in a note. APA 7 Waddell, S. W. (2025). *Advancing U.S. cyberspace policies in the age of AI and Web 3.0: A comparative case study on securing United States national security interests* \[Doctoral dissertation (Doctor of Strategic Intelligence), American Public University System\]. ProQuest Dissertations & Theses. Copy citation in APA 7 format MLA 9 Waddell, Scott Wayne. *Advancing U.S. Cyberspace Policies in the Age of AI and Web 3.0: A Comparative Case Study on Securing United States National Security Interests*. 2025, ProQuest Dissertations & Theses. American Public University System, Doctoral dissertation (Doctor of Strategic Intelligence). *ProQuest*, . Copy citation in MLA 9 format Chicago 18 · bibliography Waddell, Scott Wayne. “Advancing U.S. Cyberspace Policies in the Age of AI and Web 3.0: A Comparative Case Study on Securing United States National Security Interests.” Doctoral dissertation (Doctor of Strategic Intelligence), American Public University System, 2025. ProQuest Dissertations & Theses. . Copy citation in Chicago 18 · bibliography format Chicago 18 · author-date Waddell, Scott Wayne. 2025. “Advancing U.S. Cyberspace Policies in the Age of AI and Web 3.0: A Comparative Case Study on Securing United States National Security Interests.” Doctoral dissertation (Doctor of Strategic Intelligence), American Public University System. ProQuest Dissertations & Theses. . 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[Link to this presentation](https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/) Copy slide link ## Structured metadata ```json [ { "@context": "https://schema.org", "@type": "WebPage", "url": "https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/", "inLanguage": "en", "isPartOf": { "@type": "WebSite", "name": "Strategic Intelligence Research", "url": "https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/" } }, { "@context": "https://schema.org", "@type": "WebPage", "@id": "https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/", "url": "https://www.strategicintelligenceresearch.org/studies/advancing-us-cyberspace-policies/", "isBasedOn": { "@type": "Thesis", "@id": "https://www.proquest.com/docview/3180520287", "url": "https://www.proquest.com/docview/3180520287", "name": "Advancing U.S. cyberspace policies in the age of AI and Web 3.0: A comparative case study on securing United States national security interests", "author": [ { "@type": "Person", "name": "Scott Wayne Waddell" } ] } } ] ```